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The Constitution’s Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses are meant to 
prevent corruption and conflicts of interest. The Foreign Emoluments Clause 
prohibits some federal officials, including the president, from receiving payments 
or other benefits from foreign governments, while the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause bans the president from receiving payments other than the office’s salary 
from the federal and state governments. To enforce the clauses, this report 
recommends requiring the president to divest from business interests and 
increasing powers to investigate and punish violations of the clauses. 
 
This report was researched and written during the 2018-2019 academic year by 
students in Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution Clinic, which 
is focused on developing non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the 
nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic's reports are available 
at law.fordham.edu/democracyreports. 
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For decades, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (“OLC”) has opined on questions regarding the proper 
application of the Emoluments Clauses. The publicly available 
opinions indicate the OLC has considered partially overlapping 
factors when evaluating potential violations of the clauses. In 
analyzing questions regarding the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
OLC looks at (1) whether the person or persons in question 
hold an “office of profit or trust;” (2) whether the organization 
providing the emoluments is truly a foreign government; and 
(3) whether the receipt of the emoluments would make the 
recipient susceptible to undue influence or corruption. To 
resolve questions where the Domestic Emoluments Clause is 
implicated, the OLC’s analysis relies primarily on the last factor: 
the likely impact of receiving the emoluments. 
Government employees and members of Congress are required 
to comply with ethics and conflict of interest laws and rules, 
some of which enforce the Foreign Emoluments Clause. There is 
wide agreement that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to 
appointed positions in the federal government. Accordingly, the 
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act bars employees in appointed 
positions from receiving “gift[s] or decoration[s]” from foreign 
governments absent consent from Congress. Even though 
there is some debate over whether the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause applies to elected officials, ethics rules for members 
of the House and Senate state that the Constitution prevents 
them from receiving “present[s]” from foreign governments. 
These regulations are very much within the spirit of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause in that they ensure that government 
employees and members of Congress are not improperly 
soliciting or receiving gifts from foreign sources.
II.  In Support of a Broad Interpretation  
of “Emoluments”
We argue for a broader view of the term “emoluments,” which 
bars those subject to the Emoluments Clauses from profiting 
from foreign and domestic Emoluments governments. The 
framers would have understood the term “emoluments” to have 
a broad meaning, defined as any “profit,” “gain,” or “advantage.” 
Additionally, when considering the factors the OLC has 
looked to in interpreting the Emoluments Clauses as well as 
the regulations that Congress and the executive branch have 
imposed on themselves to prevent corruption, we believe that a 
broader definition is more aligned with the spirit of the clauses.
Executive Summary
The Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses were included 
in the Constitution to prevent corruption and the perception of 
conflicts of interest in government. The Constitution’s framers 
understood the consequences of corrupt government officials, 
particularly executive officers who could be easily bribed or 
coerced into acting against the nation’s interests. This report 
explores the history of the Emoluments Clauses from the 
Constitutional Convention to their modern interpretations, 
discusses our understanding of the proper interpretation of the 
clauses, and proposes policies to codify the clauses’ spirit. 
I. History and Context
The origins of the Emoluments Clauses can be traced to the 
1650s, when the Dutch prohibited their foreign ministers from 
receiving “any presents, directly or indirectly, in any manner or 
way whatever.” Influenced by this rule, the framers added their 
own version to the Articles of Confederation, the United States’ 
first constitution. 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause prohibits officers of the United 
States from accepting gifts, emoluments, or titles from foreign 
governments. At the Constitutional Convention, the framers 
discussed their concerns about foreign influence and corruption 
in light of gift-giving schemes British monarchs used to 
manipulate members of Parliament. Concerned that European 
kings might use the same schemes to gain influence over the 
newly formed American government, the framers added the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause to the Constitution. 
The Domestic Emoluments Clause sets terms for the 
president’s compensation and bans the president from receiving 
emoluments from the United States or any of the individual 
states. The framers were not just concerned with corruption 
emanating from foreign influence attempts; they recognized 
it could also have domestic sources, and they intended the 
Domestic Emoluments Clause as a bulwark against those 
threats. The Domestic Emoluments Clause was designed to 
prevent the president from becoming beholden to Congress or 
any of the state governments.
The debate over the definition of “emoluments” as used in 
Constitution is ongoing in academia and in the courts. Some 
scholars argue “emoluments” should be defined broadly to 
include any “profit,” “gain,” “benefit,” or “advantage,” while 
others submit that it should be interpreted narrowly to only 
include profits derived from carrying out the duties of office.
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C. Penalties
The OGE should be authorized to demand that executive 
branch employees who violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
disgorge all profits from the foreign source and work with 
OGE to terminate the conflict through supervised divestiture. 
Employees who have committed multiple violations or failed to 
properly divest from their potentially conflicted assets should 
be subject to fines. Given that any president whose conflict 
was detected by this OGE unit would be in violation of both 
a constitutional provision and the divestment portion of our 
proposed legislation, a fine would be an appropriate remedy 
in addition to disgorgement and divestment. Depending on 
the circumstances, Congress might consider impeachment 
proceedings.
III. Policy Proposals
To better address the concerns that inspired the Emoluments 
Clauses, we propose that Congress pass legislation enacting the 
clauses’ intent. 
A. Mandatory Divestment 
We recommend mandating that the president divest from 
any businesses that he or she has an ownership interest in by 
either liquidating their assets or transferring that interest into a 
qualified blind trust for the duration of their presidency. 
B.  Strengthening O!ce of Government Ethics
We also recommend strengthening the Office of Government 
Ethics (“OGE”) by adding an arm of the office specifically 
tasked with investigating potential violations of the Emoluments 
Clauses. This unit within OGE should be given the necessary 
investigatory tools and resources to examine potential 
violations involving executive branch officials. The unit should 
also have authority to either take unilateral disciplinary action or 
refer the matter to Congress for it decide whether to exercise its 
discretion under the Foreign Emolument to provide consent for 
receipt of emoluments.
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Introduction
Should the president of United States be allowed to profit 
from foreign governments or from the United States or any 
of the individual states while serving in office? This question, 
which has become the subject of increased public debate since 
the 2016 presidential election, does not have a clear answer 
in the Constitution. The framers were fearful that officers of 
the United States, particularly the president, could become 
susceptible to undue influence. To protect against corruption, 
the framers included the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments 
Clauses in the Constitution. But the exact meaning and 
application of these clauses is the subject of continuing debate. 
In this report, we present the history of the clauses, our position 
on their meaning, and our proposal for laws to codify their spirit. 
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The origins of the Emoluments Clauses stretch back to the 
1600s. The Dutch, in 1651, barred their foreign ministers from 
accepting “any presents, directly or indirectly, in any manner or 
way whatever.”1 This rule seems to have directly influenced the 
inclusion of a similar clause in the Articles of Confederation,2 
the United States’ first constitution.3 When weaknesses in 
the Articles of Confederation led the framers to convene in 
1787, concerns about corruption persisted. At the Philadelphia 
Convention, the framers worried that undue influence from 
both foreign and domestic sources could undermine the new 
government they were designing. As defense against this 
threat, they included the Foreign and Domestic Clauses in the 
Constitution.4
A. The Foreign Emoluments Clause
The Foreign Emoluments Clause prohibits officers of the United 
States from accepting gifts, emoluments, or titles from foreign 
governments. It states:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: 
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under 
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept 
of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind 
whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.5
The impetus for this clause lay in the framers awareness 
of the gift-giving schemes that were common in European 
governments. British monarchs had a history of manipulating 
members of Parliament with “gifts, offices, and other 
inducements.”6 And European kings often gave presents to 
foreign ministers.7 Benjamin Franklin, well known for his love 
of France, found himself at the center of a controversy when 
he received a diamond-adorned snuff box from King Louis.8 
Concerned about the perception of corruption, Franklin asked 
for and was granted permission by Congress to keep the 
present.9 
1 Norman L. Eisen et al., The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and 
Application to Donald J. Trump, BROOKINGS 4 (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-
clause1.pdf.
2 Id.
3 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 13 (2016).
4 See KEVIN J. HICKEY & MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11086, THE 
EMOLUMENTS CLAUSES OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2019).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
6 Eisen, supra note 1, at 6.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
At the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pickney of South 
Carolina made the case for including the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause by urging “the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers 
[and] other officers of the U.S. independent of external 
influence.”10 Edmund Jennings Randolph of Virginia also 
advocated for the clause, describing the response in the United 
States to a foreign king giving an American ambassador a 
present.11 He said, “It was thought proper, in order to exclude 
corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office 
from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign 
states.”12 Randolph asserted that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause was “provided to prevent corruption.”13
B. The Domestic Emoluments Clause
The Domestic Emoluments Clause sets terms for compensation 
for the president and bans the president from receiving 
emoluments from the United States or any of the individual 
states. It states:
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, 
a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor 
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been 
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any 
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.14
The origins of the Domestic Emoluments Clause can be traced 
back to provisions in early state constitutions designed to curb 
domestic corruption. For example, Maryland’s constitution 
prohibited individuals holding offices of public trust from 
accepting any presents from foreign states, the United States, 
or any of the individual states without consent.15 Similarly, 
Massachusetts’ constitution of 1780 set a salary for the 
governor to ensure he would “not be under the undue influence 
of any of the members of the general court by a dependence on 
them for his support.”16 The salary provision further states that 
its purpose is to encourage the governor to act in the interest of 
the public instead of focusing on his private affairs.17
10 Id. at 4-5 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 389 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911)).
11 Id. at 5 (citing 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911)).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
15 M.D. CONST. § XXXII (1776).
16 M.A. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 13 (1780).
17 Id.
I. History and Context
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At the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin opposed 
compensating the executive for his services. He cited men’s 
“love of power, and the love of money” in arguing that a salary 
would attract corrupt leaders.18 Franklin did not prevail in his 
opposition to a presidential salary provision because other 
delegates thought a salary would help maintain the president’s 
independence from the legislature.19 Like the Massachusetts 
constitution’s salary provision, the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause sets a fixed compensation for the president that cannot 
be adjusted while the president is in office.20 Without a fixed 
salary, the framers believed the legislature might increase or 
decrease the president’s compensation to bend him to its will.21
The fixed salary was also intended to prevent the president 
from extorting the legislature. The framers were aware of 
examples of colonial governors refusing to take certain actions 
unless they received pay increases.22 And Franklin, in adamantly 
opposing an absolute presidential veto power, had shared 
Pennsylvania’s experience with a governor who had frequently 
threatened to veto legislation unless the legislature increased 
his salary or provided him with other benefits.23
Franklin and John Rutledge were not satisfied that preventing 
the legislature from changing the president’s salary would 
be enough to prevent corruption—the legislature and state 
governments might still seek to provide benefits to the president 
to influence his behavior. They proposed adding language to 
the salary provision barring the president from receiving “any 
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”24 
The additional language received swift approval from the other 
delegates.25
C. Defining “Emoluments”
The current debate around the definition of “emolument” is 
based on how the term was used by the framers, its dictionary 
definitions throughout history, and how the Emoluments Clauses 
18 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 82 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
19 Brianne J. Gorod et al., The Domestic Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and 
Application to Donald J. Trump, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. 4 (July 2017), https://
www.theusconstitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/20170726_
White_Paper_Domestic_Emoluments_Clause.pdf.
20 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; M.A. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 13 (1780).
21 Gorod, supra note 19, at 1. 
22 See id. at 6.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id.
have been applied. Advocates for a broad interpretation of the 
term assert that it includes anything of value.26 As support for 
this definition, they look to the influences on the Constitution’s 
framers. Among the most significant influences on the framers 
were the works of Sir William Blackstone, an English jurist who 
authored the “Commentaries on the Laws of England.”27 William 
D. Bader asserts that “Commentaries” “was the singularly most 
important intellectual influence on the attorneys who drafted 
the Constitution.”28 John Mikhail notes that in “Commentaries” 
the term emoluments is used broadly to mean “profit,” “gain,” 
“benefit,” or “advantage.”29 Mikhail also studied English language 
dictionaries published between 1604 and 1806, finding that 
in over 92% of these dictionaries, emolument was defined as 
“profit,” “advantage,” “gain,” or “benefit.”30
In response to arguments that “emoluments” only refers to 
benefits tied to holding public office, Mikhail highlights that 
Blackstone used “emoluments” in the “context of family 
inheritance, private employment, and private ownership of 
land.”31 In addition, Mikhail observes that Blackstone argued 
in a copyright case in 1761 that a person should not be able to 
profit by publishing another person’s work because doing so 
“would be converting, to one’s own Emolument, the Fruits of 
another’s Labour.”32 
But not all historical evidence necessarily supports a broad 
interpretation of “emolument.” Seth Tillman argues that 
President Washington’s purchase of public land in office 
indicates that the definition of emolument should be narrow.33 
Tillman asserts that if the framers meant for “emoluments” 
to be interpreted broadly in the Domestic Emoluments 
26 See, e.g., Complaint, Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash. v. Donald 
J. Trump, 276 F.Supp.3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see also Brief for Amici 
Curiae Certain Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and in 
Opposition to Writ of Mandamus, In re: Donald J. Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th 
Cir. 2019). 
27 Sir William Blackstone, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, https://www.aoc.gov/art/
relief-portrait-plaques-lawgivers/sir-william-blackstone (last updated Apr. 
29, 2016).
28 William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice, 49 DUQ. L. 
REV. 35, 40 (2011) (quoting William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, 
Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 9 (1994)). 
29 John Mikhail, “Emolument” in Blackstone’s Commentaries, BALKINIZATION 
(May 28, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/05/emolument-in-
blackstones-commentaries.html.
30 John Mikhail, The Definition of ‘Emolument’ in English Language and 
Legal Dictionaries, 1523-1806 1 (June 30, 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2995693.
31 Mikhail, “Emolument” in Blackstone’s Commentaries, supra note 29.
32 Id. 
33 Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s ‘Emoluments’ 
Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 764-65 (2017).
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Clause to cover benefits beyond those related to an office, 
then Washington’s actions were “grossly negligent” because 
he engaged in a private business transaction with the 
government.34 But Tillman reasons that Washington would not 
have engaged in the sale if the framers’ intended the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause to bar such transactions.35 Mikhail agrees 
with Tillman that “emolument” in the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause is meant to apply only to emoluments the president 
receives for his services in office.36 
Jed Shugerman disagrees with Tillman’s position, arguing that 
Washington may have violated the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause.37 Shugerman points out that the framers were fallible 
men who were also known to have accepted presents from 
foreign states, potentially violating the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause.38 Additionally, Shugerman argues there is little evidence 
that Washington’s land deal was in fact public, which could 
account for the lack of contemporary criticism of the sale.39 
1. O!ce of Legal Counsel’s Interpretations
For decades, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) has provided guidance to government employees and 
officials, including presidents, on potential violations of the 
Emoluments Clauses. These decisions have not been entirely 
consistent through the years in their definitions of “emolument” 
and “Office of Profit or Trust.”40 But the OLC opinions do provide 
some of the only insights into interpretations of the Emoluments 
Clauses by a government entity. While the opinions do not 
explicitly endorse a broad definition of “emoluments,” they 
do show that the OLC has consistently considered the anti-
corruption spirit of the two clauses.
The publicly available opinions41 involving the Emoluments 
Clauses indicate that the OLC has considered three factors 
when determining whether acceptance of certain profits or 
34 Id. at 763.
35 See id. at 763-64. 
36 Mikhail, The Definition of ‘Emolument’ in English Language and Legal 
Dictionaries, supra note 30, at 21-22.
37 Jed Shugerman, George Washington’s Secret Land Deal Actually Strengthens 
CREW’s Emoluments Claim, TAKE CARE (June 2, 2017), https://takecareblog.
com/blog/george-washington-s-secret-land-deal-actually-strengthens-
crew-s-emoluments-claim.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See generally Gary J. Edles, Service on Federal Advisory Committees: A Case 
Study of OLC’s Little-Known Emoluments Clause Jurisprudence, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1 (2006). 
41 The OLC has not published every opinion regarding the Emoluments 
Clauses, meaning changes or reversals in the office’s analysis might be 
obscured from public view. Id. at 4.
gains violates either the Domestic or Foreign Emoluments 
Clause. In analyzing questions regarding the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, the office considers (1) whether the 
person or persons who are receiving the profits or gains hold 
an “Office of Profit or Trust,”42 (2) whether the organization 
providing the emoluments is truly a foreign government,43 
and (3) whether the receipt of the emoluments would make 
the recipient susceptible to undue influence or corruption.44 
The third component is the main factor for analyzing possible 
violations of the Domestic Emoluments Clause.45
The OLC has gradually narrowed its view of the positions that 
are “Office[s] of Profit or Trust.”46 In the early 1990s, the office 
declared that unpaid members of federal advisory committees 
held offices of trust, making them subject to the limitations 
in the Foreign Emoluments Clause.47 But within three years 
of issuing this interpretation, the office withdrew it. In a letter 
to the Legal Advisor of the State Department, the OLC wrote, 
“We agree that not every member of an advisory committee 
necessarily occupies an ‘Office of Profit or Trust’ under the 
Clause and accordingly that the April 29, 1991 OLC opinion on 
advisory committees was overbroad.”48
42 See Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the President’s 
Council on Bioethics, 29 Op. O.L.C. 55 (2005) (concluding that “to be an 
‘office’ a position must at least involve some exercise of governmental 
authority, and an advisory position does not.”); Application of Emoluments 
Clause to Part-Time Consultant for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
10 Op. O.L.C. 96, 99 (1986) (determining that a part-time consultant held 
an office of profit or trust because he was required to take an oath of office, 
have a security clearance, follow the rules and regulations of the NRC, and 
be “on call to serve the agency.”); Payment of Compensation to Individual 
in Receipt of Compensation From a Foreign Government, OFF. LEGAL COUNS. 
(Oct. 4, 1954) (analyzing whether a DOJ employee who was appointed by 
the attorney general and took oath prescribed for all persons appointed to 
offices of honor or profit held an office of profit or trust).
43 See Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government 
Employees by Foreign Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994) 
(concluding that two NASA employees receiving compensation for 
teaching positions at a foreign university while on unpaid leave from NASA 
were not violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause because the university 
acted independently of the foreign state in making employment decisions); 
Expense Reimbursement in Connection with Chairman Stone’s Trip to 
Indonesia, OFF. LEGAL COUNS. (Aug. 11, 1980) (concluding that an expense 
reimbursement was not an emolument when paid to the chairman of an 
independent agency for a consulting trip to Indonesia organized by Harvard 
University because the Indonesian government did not directly pay the 
reimbursement and did not have a role in choosing the visiting consultants). 
44 See Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and 
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. 
O.L.C. 1 (2009); President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits 
from the State of California, 5 Op. O.L.C 187 (1981).
45 See President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the 
State of California, 5 Op. O.L.C 187 (1981).
46 Edles, supra note 40, at 7-9. 
47 Id. at 8.
48 Id. at 9.
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Whether the president holds an “Office of Profit or Trust” is 
the subject of scholarly debate. Seth Tillman argues that the 
president is not an officer under the United States.49 Tillman 
points to President Washington’s acceptance of foreign 
gifts without the consent of Congress and to a list made by 
Alexander Hamilton in response to a request to name all the 
persons holding office under the United States.50 Hamilton 
did not include the president or other elected officials in this 
list.51 But others assert that it is more likely that the Senate was 
requesting a list of “civil offices,” which would include appointed 
offices instead of elected offices.52 In the OLC’s 2009 opinion 
on the applicability of the Foreign Emoluments Clause to 
President Barack Obama’s acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, 
the office took a clear position on whether the clause covered 
the president. The opinion stated that “the President surely 
‘holds an Office of Profit or Trust’…”53
The OLC has maintained that “any emoluments from a foreign 
State, whether dispensed through its political or diplomatic 
arms or through other agencies are forbidden to Federal office-
holders (unless Congress consents).”54 But the office has made 
exceptions for some entities tied to foreign governments. It 
decided in 1994 that the Foreign Emoluments Clause “does 
not apply in cases of government employees offered faculty 
employment by a foreign public university where it can be 
shown that the university acts independently of the foreign 
state when making faculty employment decisions.”55 In the case 
of President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize, the office assessed 
that the Nobel Committee, which awards the prize, is “not a 
‘foreign State’ within the Clause’s meaning.”56 
49 Seth Barrett Tillman, The Foreign Emolument Clause Reached Only Appointed 
Officers, CONSTITUTION CENTER, https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/interpretations/the-foreign-emoluments-clause-reached-
only-appointed-officers (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Gautham Rao & Jed Shugerman, Presidential Revisionism, SLATE (July 17, 2017, 
5:42 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/07/the-new-york-
times-published-the-flimsiest-defense-of-trumps-apparent-emoluments-
violations.html; Frank Bowman, Foreign Emoluments, the President & Professor 
Tillman, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES (Oct. 27, 2019), https://impeachableoffenses.
net/2017/10/27/foreign-emoluments-the-president-professor-tillman/; 
contra Seth Barrett Tillman, The Blue Book & the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
Cases Against the President: Old Questions Answered, NEW REFORM CLUB (Dec. 
31, 2017), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-blue-book-
foreign-emoluments-clause.html.
53 Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and 
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, supra 
note 44, at 4. 
54 Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government 
Employees by Foreign Public Universities, supra note 43.
55 Id. 
56 Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and 
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, supra 
note 44, at 4.
Opinions involving the applicability of the Emoluments Clauses 
to presidents have placed significant emphasis on whether 
receiving emoluments leads to undue influence on the recipient. 
One of these opinions, which is unpublished but referenced in 
subsequent opinions, concerns the ability of President John F. 
Kennedy’s estate to accept naval retirement payments that had 
accrued while Kennedy was in office.57 The OLC determined 
that these payments would not violate the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause because Kennedy had earned them prior to 
taking office and he would not have to fulfill any obligations as a 
condition of accepting the payments.58 The opinion stated that 
its reasoning was based on the purpose of the clause, which the 
OLC said would not be furthered by barring receipt of payments 
Kennedy was entitled to before taking office.59 
Two opinions—one in 1981 from the OLC and another in 1983 
from the Comptroller General—analyzed whether President 
Ronald Reagan could receive retirement benefits earned while 
serving as governor of California. The OLC opinion begins 
by considering broad and narrow dictionary definitions of 
“emolument.” The narrow definition in the Oxford English 
dictionary that the opinion references defined “emoluments” 
as “profit or gain arising from station, office, or employment: 
reward, remuneration, salary.”60 The broad definition in the 
same dictionary described an emolument as an “advantage, 
benefit, comfort,” but the opinion calls this definition obsolete.61 
Instead of relying solely on the dictionary definitions of the 
term, the OLC considers the historical evidence surrounding 
the drafting of the Domestic Emoluments Clause. The opinion 
observes, “[I]t appears the term emolument has a strong 
connotation of, if it is not indeed limited to, payments which 
have a potential of influencing or corrupting the integrity of 
the recipient.”62 The OLC concludes that “retirement benefits 
are not emoluments within the meaning of the Constitution 
because interests of this kind were not contemplated by the 
members of the Constitutional Convention…”63 The opinion 
adds that receipt of such benefits does not violate the “spirit of 
the Constitution because they do not subject the President to 
any improper influence.”64 
57  President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the State of 
California, supra note 45. 
58 Id. at 189.
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 188.
61 Id. 
62 Id.
63 Id. at 192.
64 Id. 
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The 1983 Comptroller General Memo concludes that 
“emoluments” as used in the Domestic Emoluments Clause 
“does not extend to payments for services rendered prior to the 
occupancy of, and having no connection with the Presidency.”65 
Citing Federalist 73, the memo states that the purpose of the 
clause is to prevent the president from being subject to undue 
65 Letter from Milton J. Socolar, Off. of the Comptroller Gen., to George J. 
Mitchell, U.S. Senate (Jan. 18, 1983). 
influence in carrying out his duties. Accordingly, the memo 
reasons that it is inapplicable when the benefits the president is 
to receive have already been earned and have no connection to 
the presidency.66
These OLC opinions indicate that while the office has generally 
viewed the actual profit or gain from foreign and domestic actors 
as “emoluments,” they have generally considered each potential 
violation on a case-by-case basis to determine if the particular 
emoluments in question would have a corrupting influence.
66 Id.
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The Constitution’s framers intended the Emoluments Clauses 
to protect against government corruption. This purpose is 
hindered by interpretations of the clauses that cover only gains 
or profits derived from carrying out the duties of office. 
In the Foreign Emoluments Clause, “emoluments” is best 
interpreted broadly to bar any profits or benefits from foreign 
governments. The Domestic Emoluments Clause should be 
interpreted to prevent the president from receiving any profits 
or benefits from state governments or the federal government, 
aside from his or her salary. A broad reading of the clauses is 
not only consistent with the framers’ intentions. It also reflects 
the framers likely understanding of the term “emoluments,” 
which, as evidenced by John Mikhail’s work, is likely to have 
been any “profit,” “gain,” or “advantage.”67 Instead of limiting the 
scope of “emoluments” in these clauses, the framers describe 
the restrictions imposed by the clauses in broad terms, such 
as prohibiting presents, titles, and emoluments of “any kind 
whatever” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause.68 
67 See generally Mikhail, supra note 30.
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
Additionally, the OLC’s interpretations of the Emoluments Clauses 
indicate that a broader understanding is more aligned with the 
clauses’ spirit. In evaluating possible violations of the clauses, 
the office has placed significant emphasis on the potential of the 
alleged benefits to influence the recipient.69 Bad actors have a 
variety of methods to exert influence over government officials 
that can go beyond traditional bribery. The framers understood 
the concepts of quid pro quo and bribery but chose not to write 
the Emoluments Clauses in these terms. The concerns about 
corruption extend further than government officials accepting 
some benefit in exchange for carrying out official actions. 
Instead, concerns of undue influence extend to the states of 
mind of these government officials. There is, at the very least, 
a perception that a government official who is profiting from a 
foreign or domestic government is not truly acting in the best 
interests of the United States. The mere perception of undue 
influence or corruption could taint every decision made by such 
an official. To prevent perceptions of corruption and actual 
corruption, the Emoluments Clauses should be interpreted 
broadly—how the balance of historical evidence indicates the 
framers intended them to be interpreted. As such, the following 
proposals embrace the broader definition of emoluments. 
69 See President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the 
State of California, supra note 45.
II. In Support of a Broad Interpretation of “Emoluments”
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To better address the concerns that prompted the framers 
to include the Emoluments Clauses in the Constitution, we 
recommend a federal law mandating that the president divest 
from any businesses that he or she has an ownership interest in 
by either liquidating their assets or transferring that interest into 
a qualified blind trust for the period of their presidency. We also 
recommend legislation strengthening the Office of Government 
Ethics (“OGE”) by adding an arm of the office specifically 
tasked with investigating potential violations of the Emoluments 
Clauses by executive branch officials. This unit would have the 
authority to either refer matters to the Department of Justice or 
to Congress for it to decide whether consent should be granted 
to an official to receive foreign emoluments. 
This Part begins by describing relevant existing ethics laws 
to provide context for our recommendations. The following 
three sections of this Part describe the different aspects of 
our proposal: (1) a mandatory divestment requirement for 
the president; (2) strengthening the Office of Government 
Ethics; and (3) the penalties for violating the restrictions in the 
Emoluments Clauses. This Part concludes with a discussion of 
some of the alternative proposals we considered.
A. Ethics Requirements in Government
Throughout government, employees and members of Congress 
are required to comply with ethics and conflict of interest 
laws. Published by the Office of Government Ethics, the 
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 
Branch was codified at 5 C.F.R. Part 2635.70 These regulations 
bar employees from “holding financial interests that conflict 
with the conscientious performance of duty” or soliciting or 
accepting gifts or items of monetary value from any “person 
or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or 
conducting activities regulated by the employee’s agency, 
or whose interests may be substantially affected by the 
performance or nonperformance of the employee’s duties.”71 
Employees are also prohibited from using their positions for 
private gain.72 Additionally, employees are not allowed to accept 
or solicit gifts from “prohibited sources” or gifts given to the 
employee because of their position in government.73 
70 Employee Standards of Conduct, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www.oge.
gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Employee%20Standards%20of%20Conduct (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2019).
71 Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 
C.F.R. pt. 2635.
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
There are some exceptions to accepting unsolicited gifts. 
Employees are permitted to accept gifts with a market value of $20 
or less per occasion from the same source, but, in a given calendar 
year, they cannot accept gifts from the same source with a total 
value of more than $50. Food and entertainment in domestic or 
foreign settings are also exempted, so long as non-government 
employees are not required to pay for the same events.74 
Both the House and Senate ethics committees have imposed 
rules against the acceptance of gifts. The Senate rules generally 
forbid all members, officers, and employees from knowingly 
accepting any gifts valued at over $50.75 But the Senate Ethics 
Committee’s website states, “The U.S. Constitution prohibits 
government officials, including Members, officers, and 
employees of Congress, from receiving any present of any kind 
from a foreign state or representative without the consent of 
Congress.”76 The House Ethics Manual similarly states, “The 
Constitution prohibits federal government officials, including 
Members and employees of Congress, from receiving ‘any 
present . . . of any kind whatever’ from a foreign state or a 
representative of a foreign government without the consent of 
the Congress.”77 Congress has consented to the acceptance of 
some foreign gifts, such as gifts worth no more than $100 given 
as souvenirs or as a courtesy.78 Any gift exceeding this value can 
only be accepted if a refusal to accept would be offensive to the 
giving nation.79 Such a gift is accepted on behalf of the United 
States and within 60 days of receipt must be turned over for 
disposal.80 But members can request authorization to use the 
gift during their tenures.81
Additionally, both Senate and House members and staff 
are prohibited from earning significant income from outside 
sources and are barred from conducting professional services, 
such as legal services, for compensation.82 Finally, the Senate 
74 Id.
75 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. No. 113-18, r. XXXV, at 1(2)(A) 
(2013); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES r. XXV, at 5(a)(1)(B)(i) (2015).
76 Gifts, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, https://www.ethics.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?p=Gifts (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
77 COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH CONG., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 
57 (2008). 
78 See Gifts, supra note 76; Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 5 U.S.C § 7342 
(2011); Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act, 22 U.S.C § 2451 
(2015).
79 Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 5 U.S.C § 7342 (2011).
80 Id. 
81 Id.
82 Conflicts of Interest, SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, https://www.ethics.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/conflictsofinterest (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
III. Policy Proposals
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and House restrict their members from serving on the boards of 
organizations for compensation.83
These Senate and House rules and statutory provisions 
addressing conflicts of interest and the acceptance of gifts 
show that Congress is concerned with the possibility of undue 
influence on its members and employees. These regulations 
are consistent with the spirit of the Emoluments Clauses; 
they ensure that members of Congress are not soliciting and 
accepting any sort of benefit from sources that might lead to 
the appearance of corruption or actual corruption.
B. Mandatory Divestment
Our proposal would require the president and his or her spouse 
and minor children to divest from all business interests while 
the president is in office. This proposal draws on two proposed 
bills that have been introduced in Congress. Senator Elizabeth 
Warren introduced the first bill, the Presidential Conflicts 
of Interest Act of 2017. It would compel the president, vice 
president, and their spouses and minor children to divest from 
any business interest that posed a conflict, as determined by 
the OGE, by selling the interest and then purchasing conflict-
free holdings with the gains from the sale.84 To provide OGE 
with sufficient information about the president’s conflicts, the 
legislation would require the president and vice president to 
file more detailed financial disclosures, including three years of 
tax returns.85 The bill provides a cause of action to enforce the 
divestiture to the U.S. attorney general, the attorney general of 
any state, or any aggrieved person. It further states that failing 
to divest is a high crime or misdemeanor,86 which is part of the 
Constitution’s standard for impeachment and removal.87
Representative Katherine Clark of Massachusetts proposed a 
similar bill in 2019. The Presidential Accountability Act would 
amend the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 by adding financial 
disclosure requirements for the president and vice president.88 It 
would also require the president and vice president to divest any 
business interests that created a conflict by either converting 
the interest to cash or placing it in a qualified blind trust.89 
Neither of these proposed bills have become law. 
83 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 75, at r. XXXVII, at 6(a); RULES OF 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 75, at r. XXV, at 2(d). 
84 See Presidential Conflicts of Interest Act of 2017, S. 65, 115th Cong. (2017).
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
88 See Presidential Accountability Act, H.R. 1481, 116th Cong. (2019). 
89 See id.
Our proposal would borrow elements from both bills. While 
liquidation of business interests is preferable because it would 
eliminate all possible conflicts, it would be a difficult imposition 
on presidents with complicated or extensive personal holdings. 
It might even deter people with substantial assets from 
running for office, as it would make transitioning back into their 
business lives much more complicated after leaving office. The 
Presidential Accountability Act provides a preferable alternative: 
letting presidents choose between liquidation and placing the 
assets into a qualified blind trust. Qualified blind trusts are 
overseen by OGE and ensure that the beneficiary of the trust has 
no control over the assets involved.90 Congress mandating that 
the president place his or her holdings in this type of trust would 
be a stronger step towards preventing conflicts of interest, if not 
a completely sufficient preventative measure in all instances.
Elements that we would borrow from Senator Warren’s bill 
are the enhanced financial disclosures to OGE and the opinion 
of Congress that failure to properly disclose or divest assets 
would be a high crime or misdemeanor. Without disclosure to 
OGE of all assets it would be impossible to determine whether 
a president has properly divested. A statement from Congress 
that failing to properly divest would be impeachable offense 
would send a clear message to the president that compliance 
with the law was required. It would also provide a strong basis 
for Congress to initiate impeachment proceedings if it believed 
the president’s failure was serious enough to merit such a step.
Our proposal would go further than either of the proposed 
bills by mandating that the president divest from all business 
interests, instead of only conflicted business interests. This 
requirement would go further towards eliminating any 
possibility of impropriety and it would make executing the 
mandate easier in some respects, as neither OGE nor the 
president and their staff would have to engage in the potentially 
complex and time consuming process of determining whether 
each business interest created a conflict. 
The proposed bills require the vice president to abide by the 
same divestment requirements as the president, but our proposal 
does not impose these obligations on the vice president. The 
vice president does not have the same level of decision-making 
authority or the same position of public trust as the president, so 
the balance between the vice president’s personal interests and 
the interests of the public in knowing the government is free of 
perceived and actual conflicts of interest weighs more in the vice 
president’s favor. We propose that the vice president, as well as 
all other members of the executive branch, only be subject to the 
second part of our proposal, the newly created watchdog branch 
90 See Qualified Blind Trusts, 5 C.F.R. § 2634.403 (2006).
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of OGE. But our proposal would establish a process for timely 
divestment of all of the vice president’s business interests should 
the vice president ascend to the presidency.
Requiring presidents to divest from their business interests upon 
taking office is controversial, even though executive branch 
officials routinely divest from their assets before taking office.91 
This level of regulation of the executive branch by Congress 
might face challenges on a separation of powers theory.92 
Some fear that such a divestment requirement would dissuade 
qualified candidates from seeking the office by imposing a 
reverse property qualification on candidates.93 While we do not 
believe that a mandatory divestment would bar anyone eligible 
from seeking the presidency, these concerns are valid. No policy 
should be implemented that strongly dissuades any group, 
including wealthy individuals and those with complex personal 
holdings, from running for president. Many who have achieved 
financial success have done so through innovative thinking, 
discipline, and leadership—all desirable qualities for the nation’s 
top executive. Therefore, it will be important for Congress 
to structure the divestment requirement to avoid needlessly 
discouraging anyone from running for president. 
C.  Strengthening the O!ce of Government 
Ethics
The second part of our proposal calls for a new OGE unit to 
investigate conflicts of interest, including violations of the 
Emoluments Clauses. Others have recently advocated for 
strengthening OGE’s power to enforce ethical standards in the 
federal government.94 While executive branch officials are barred 
by statute from participating in matters in which they have a 
personal financial stake,95 OGE has limited authority to investigate 
or enforce ethics laws.96 Additionally, the president and vice 
91 See, e.g., Paulson to Sell His Goldman Shares, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/22/business/22disclose.html; Laura 
Litvan, Billionaire Pritzker Confirmed as Commerce Secretary, MORNING CALL 
(June 26, 2013), https://www.mcall.com/news/mc-xpm-2013-06-26-mc-
pritzker-commerce-20130626-story.html.
92 We believe that this type of law would survive such a challenge, as 
Congress would not be acting outside of their legislative power and is not 
increasing its own power at the executive’s expense or undermining the 
proper role of the executive. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694-95 
(1988). 
93 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Seth B. Tillman, Lecturer, Maynooth Univ. 
(Mar. 15, 2019). 
94 See, e.g., Executive Branch Comprehensive Ethics Enforcement Act of 
2018, H.R. 5902, 115th Cong. (2018); NAT’L TASK FORCE ON RULE OF LAW 
& DEMOCRACY, BRENNAN CNTR. FOR JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/
TaskForceReport_2018_09_.pdf.  
95 See Acts Affecting a Personal Financial Interest, 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2010). 
96 See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON RULE OF LAW & DEMOCRACY, supra note 94, at 12.  
president are exempt from the statute preventing conflicts of 
interest.97 Our proposal would give a new OGE unit authority to 
investigate both appointed and elected officials in the executive 
branch for conflicts of interest. This unit’s investigatory mandate 
would draw from the language of the Emoluments Clauses by 
focusing on both conflicts of interest with foreign governments 
and foreign government-controlled companies as well as with the 
federal government and the states.
If the unit found potential conflicts of interest or Emoluments 
Clause violations, it would be required to refer the matter to 
the Department of Justice if it violated existing conflicts of 
interest statutes. Where the issue involved a possible violation 
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, OGE would be required 
to refer the matter to Congress so lawmakers could decide 
whether to exercise their constitutional authority to consent to 
the receipt of emoluments.98 These referrals would not have to 
be made public initially, consistent with the general principle 
of avoiding disclosure of the identities of individuals who are 
under investigation. This unit would need the investigative tools 
to thoroughly conduct its work. Accordingly, Congress should 
provide it subpoena power and the authority to issue fines for 
failure to cooperate with its investigations. 
Congress might consider placing it members under the 
jurisdiction of this new OGE unit. This proposal is designed to 
strengthen public trust, and it is important from that standpoint 
for members of Congress to be held to same standards as other 
government officials. While the statute creating the unit would 
have to be designed to avoid separation of powers issues and 
running afoul of the Speech and Debate Clause, Congress could 
decide to expand the scope of the unit to shine a spotlight on 
areas where congressional business interests create perceived 
or actual conflicts.
D. Penalties
The new OGE unit would need a way to penalize Emoluments 
Clause violations that Congress did not consent to. Federal law 
provides penalties for executive branch officials who participate 
in matters in which they have a financial stake.99 OGE should 
be authorized to demand that officials who violate the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause without breaking current conflict of interest 
laws disgorge all profits from the foreign source and work with 
97 See Andrew Stark, Can a President Trump Keep His Business Intact?, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/
trump-holdings-conflict-of-interest/503333/.
98 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
99 See Penalties and Injunctions, 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2011). 
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OGE to terminate the conflict through supervised divestiture. 
Employees who commit multiple violations or fail to properly 
divest from their potentially conflicted assets should face fines.
Devising a penalty structure for the president is more 
challenging. The current position of the Department of Justice 
is that the president cannot be indicted for alleged criminal 
conduct,100 but that position does not explicitly rule out fines.101 
Given that any president whose conflict was detected by the 
new OGE unit would be in violation of both a constitutional 
provision and the divestment portion of our proposed 
legislation, a fine would be an appropriate remedy in addition 
to disgorgement of profits and any required divestment. 
Depending on the circumstances, Congress would also have the 
option of commencing impeachment proceedings.
If Congress were to decide to impose self-regulation via this 
new OGE unit, penalties could range from mandated recusal 
on a vote to possible divestment. To comply with separation of 
powers concerns, it would be necessary for OGE to have less 
unilateral sanctioning power over members of Congress than its 
authority over executive branch officials.
E. Alternative Proposals
We considered several alternative options for addressing 
violations of the Emoluments Clauses.
1. Private Cause of Action
Congress could pass a statute describing what constituted 
violations of the Emoluments Clauses and creating a cause of 
action for parties to seek judicial review of possible violations. 
Congress has the authority to recognize specific rights in certain 
people and entities and to allow them to file lawsuits to enforce 
those rights.102 Congress could use this authority to allow parties 
whose business interests were injured by the unconstitutional 
receipt of emoluments by the president or another executive 
official to seek judicial review. Congress could also outline 
declaratory and injunctive relief for a court to provide in such 
a suit. While violation of a statute alone does not necessarily 
guarantee standing,103 any plaintiff who could show the injury 
described by the statute would likely be given standing. 
Congress could also attempt to grant itself a cause of action by 
100 A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 
24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000).
101 Id. at 230.
102 See, e.g., Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Right of 
Review, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2014).
103 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
granting the right to sue to the Speaker of the House or Senate 
Majority Leader acting on behalf of their institutions.104
This type of legislation would have several disadvantages 
compared to our primary proposal. It is possible but unlikely 
that presidential emoluments could be properly regulated 
through lawsuits. Lawsuits move at a slow pace and presidential 
terms are not particularly long, meaning that by the time any 
issues were resolved the president might be almost out of office 
or could have been compelled to make a critical decision that 
was possibly influenced by their conflict of interest. Further, 
a bill that has no clear enforcement mechanism is ripe for 
abuse by presidents who are deceptive about their business 
interests and personal assets. Nevertheless, a bill creating a 
cause of action would be an upgrade over the current paucity of 
regulatory and enforcement options.
2. Concurrent Resolution
Congress could pass a concurrent resolution outlining its 
interpretation of the Emoluments Clauses. A concurrent 
resolution is passed by both houses of Congress to set rules 
for the Congress or to express its position on an issue.105 These 
resolutions are not submitted to the president and do not carry 
the force of law.106 While a resolution outlining Congress’s 
position on the Emoluments Clauses would not be directly 
enforceable, it could serve an important public education 
function, assist courts in reviewing the clauses, and instruct 
executive branch officials on the behavior expected of them.
3. Constitutional Amendment
A constitutional amendment might clarify the existing 
language of the Emoluments Clauses or override them with a 
new anti-conflict of interest provision. But such an amendment 
seems impractical for two reasons. First, amending the 
Constitution is extremely difficult and would require much 
greater political consensus than the other proposals already 
listed. Second, the Constitution already includes these 
Emoluments Clauses, and, even if their exact interpretation 
is up for debate, their general purpose seems clear. Congress 
should focus on clarification of the existing language instead of 
trying to restart the entire debate.
104 See ALISSA M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCG. SERV., R42454, 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN ARTICLE III COURTS: STANDING TO SUE (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42454.pdf. 
105 See Types of Legislation, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm (last visited July 31, 2019). 
106 Id. 
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Conclusion
It is time for Congress to enforce the anti-corruption purpose 
behind the Emoluments Clauses. The proposed reforms will 
prevent self-dealing in government and strengthen confidence 
that government officials are acting in the public interest.


